This is a video about (170705) 주간 아이돌 310회 블랙핑크 (BLACKPINK) - Weekly idol ep 310 BLACKPINK

主要支援：已於2009年4月8日到期 延伸支援：已於2014年4月8日到期（仅限Service Pack 3 x86（SP3 x86）及Service Pack 2 x64（SP2 x64）） 新增的功能 移除的功能 版本 开发历史 批評 主题 Windows XP（开发代号：）是微软公司推出供个人电脑使用的操作系统，包括商用及家用的桌上型电脑、笔记本电脑、媒体中心（英语：）和平板电脑等。其RTM版于2001年8月24日发布；零售版于2001年10月25日上市。其名字「」的意思是英文中的「体验」（）。Windows ..

Nov 13, 2019- Explore dobdan222's board "교복", followed by 405 people on Pinterest. See more ideas about Asian girl, Korean student and Fashion.

Nov 10, 2019- Explore cutebear36088's board "여고딩", followed by 557 people on Pinterest. See more ideas about School looks, Fashion and School uniform.

Republika obeh narodov Habsburška monarhija Bavarska Saška Franconia Švabska Zaporoški kozaki Velika vojvodina Toskana Drugo obleganje Dunaja je potekalo leta 1683; pričelo se je 14. julija 1683, ko je Osmanski imperij obkolil Dunaj in končalo 11. septembra ..

Robert Henry Goldsborough (January 4, 1779 – October 5, 1836) was an American politician from Talbot County, Maryland. Goldsborough was born at "Myrtle Grove" near Easton, Maryland. He was educated by private tutors and graduated from St. John's College in ..

Anabolic steroids, also known more properly as anabolic–androgenic steroids (AAS), are steroidal androgens that include natural androgens like testosterone as well as synthetic androgens that are structurally related and have similar effects to testosterone. ..

In economics and game theory, an **all-pay auction** is an auction in which every bidder must pay regardless of whether they win the prize, which is awarded to the highest bidder as in a conventional auction.

In an all-pay auction, the Nash equilibrium is such that each bidder plays a mixed strategy and their expected pay-off is zero.^{[1]} The seller's expected revenue is equal to the value of the prize. However, some economic experiments have shown that over-bidding is common. That is, the seller's revenue frequently exceeds that of the value of the prize, and in repeated games even bidders that win the prize frequently will most likely take a loss in the long run.^{[2]}

The most straightforward form of an all-pay auction is a **Tullock auction**, sometimes called a **Tullock lottery** named after Gordon Tullock, in which everyone submits a bid but both the losers and the winners pay their submitted bids.^{[3]} This is instrumental in describing certain ideas in public choice economics.^{[citation needed]} The dollar auction is a two player Tullock auction, or a multiplayer game in which only the two highest bidders pay their bids.

A conventional lottery or raffle can also be seen as a related process, since all ticket-holders have paid but only one gets the prize. Commonplace practical examples of all-pay auctions can be found on several "penny auction" / bidding fee auction websites.

Other forms of all-pay auctions exist, such as a **war of attrition** (also known as biological auctions^{[4]}), in which the highest bidder wins, but all (or more typically, both) bidders pay only the lower bid. The war of attrition is used by biologists to model conventional contests, or agonistic interactions resolved without recourse to physical aggression.

The following analysis follows a few basic rules.^{[5]}

- Each bidder submits a bid, which only depends on their valuation.
- Bidders do not know the valuations of other bidders.
- The analysis are based on an independent private value (IPV) environment where the valuation of each bidder is drawn independently from a uniform distribution [0,1]. In the IPV environment, if my value is 0.6 then the probability that some other bidder has lower value is also 0.6. Accordingly, the probability that two other bidders have lower value is .

In IPV bidders are symmetric because valuations are from the same distribution. These make the analysis focus on symmetric and monotonic bidding strategies. This implies that two bidders with the same valuation will submit the same bid. As a result, under symmetry, the bidder with the highest value will always win.^{[5]}

Consider the two-player version of the all-pay auction and be the private valuations independent and identically distributed on a uniform distribution from [0,1]. We wish to find a monotone increasing bidding function, , that forms a symmetric Nash Equilibrium.

Note that if player bids , he wins the auction only if his bid is larger than player 's bid . The probability for this to happen is

, since is monotone and Unif[0,1]

Thus, the probability of allocation of good to is . Thus, 's expected utility when he bids as if his private value is is given by

.

For to be a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, should have its maximum at so that has no incentive to deviate given sticks with his bid of .

Upon integrating, we get .

We know that if player has private valuation , then they will bid 0; . We can use this to show that the constant of integration is also 0.

Thus, we get .

Since this function is indeed monotone increasing, this bidding strategy constitutes a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium. The revenue from the all-pay auction in this example is

Since are drawn *iid* from Unif[0,1], the expected revenue is

.

Due to the revenue equivalence theorem, all auctions with 2 players will have an expected revenue of when the private valuations are *iid* from Unif[0,1].^{[6]}

Consider a corrupt official who is dealing with campaign donors: Each wants him to do a favor that is worth somewhere between $0 and $1000 to them (uniformly distributed). Their actual valuations are $250, $500 and $750. They can only observe their own valuations. They each treat the official to an expensive present - if they spend X Dollars on the present then this is worth X dollars to the official. The official can only do one favor and will do the favor to the donor who is giving him the most expensive present.

This is a typical model for all-pay auction. To calculate the optimal bid for each donor, we need to normalize the valuations {250, 500, 750} to {0.25, 0.5, 0.75} so that IPV may apply.

According to the formula for optimal bid:

The optimal bids for three donors under IPV are:

To get the real optimal amount that each of the three donors should give, simply multiplied the IPV values by 1000:

This example implies that the official will finally get $375 but only the third donor, who donated $281.3 will win the official's favor. Note that the other two donors know their valuations are not high enough (low chance of winning), so they do not donate much, thus balancing the possible huge winning profit and the low chance of winning.

- ↑ Jehiel P, Moldovanu B (2006) Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms. In: Blundell R, Newey WK, Persson T (eds) Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, vol 1, Cambridge University Press, chap 3
- ↑ Gneezy, Uri; Smorodinsky, Rann (2006). "All-pay auctions—an experimental study".
*Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*.**61**(2): 255–275. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.013. - ↑ Dimitri, Nicola (29 November 2011).
*"MIRROR REVELATION" IN SECOND-PRICE TULLOCK AUCTIONS*. SIDE - ISLE 2011 - Seventh Annual Conference. - ↑ Chatterjee, Krishnendu; Reiter, Johannes G.; Nowak, Martin A. (2012). "Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions".
*Theoretical Population Biology*.**81**(1): 69–80. doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003. PMC 3279759. PMID 22120126. - 1 2 Auctions: Theory and Practice: The Toulouse Lectures in Economics; Paul Klemperer; Nuffield College, Oxford University, Princeton University Press, 2004
- ↑ Algorithmic Game Theory. Vazirani, Vijay V; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Eva; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Complete preprint on-line at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/cs15-892F13/algorithmic-game-theory.pdf

© 2019 raptorfind.com. Imprint, All rights reserved.